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Questions Presented
1. Is the federal criminal indictment and prosecution of Petitioner, an
enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, for his role in burglarizing a
private residence on the Cheyenne Sioux Reservation barred by the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against doublejeopardy following his conviction for
the same crime in tribal court?
2. Does Petitioner's federal prosecution violate the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause as a violation of his equal protection rights in light of the fact
that Mr. Smith, Petitioner's non-Indian alleged co-perpetrator in the burglary,
was not charged in either tribal, state, or federal court?
Statement of the Case
Statement of Facts
In July 2002, Mr. John Iron Hawk, Petitioner, was arrested by Tribal police
and charged with burglary in the Cheyenne River Sioux tribal court for
allegedly breaking and entering the home of Mr. James Johnson, a non-Indian
resident of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in South Dakota, and removing
about $500 in personal goods consisting of a stereo, fishing gear and several
Pendleton blankets. Petitioner was convicted in tribal court and did not appeal.
In September 2002, Petitioner was indicted by a federal grand jury sitting in
Pierre, South Dakota and was charged with violating the Major Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1948), which lists burglary as one of fourteen enumerated
crimes. Mr. Robert Smith, whom Petitioner alleges is his co-perpetrator, was
not charged in tribal court pursuant to the holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), that tribal courts do not have inherent
* This brief cites to a Fourteenth Circuit case named Ironhorse. This is a ficticious case
used only for the Native American Law Student Association Moot Court Competition.
** Second-year law student, University of Michigan School of Law.
* Associate, Troutman Sanders LLP, Washington, D.C. J.D., 2003, University of
Michigan School of Law.
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jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians and must be specifically authorized
to do so by an act of Congress. Mr. Smith was also not charged in federal
court pursuant to the common law rule that excludes federal criminal
jurisdiction in favor of state jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes
against non-Indians on an Indian reservation. United States v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621,624 (1881); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,644 n.4 (1977).
The Dewey County (South Dakota) Prosecutor, however, never prosecuted
Mr. Smith in state court either, believing that there was only federal
jurisdiction over Indian lands in South Dakota pursuant to South Dakota's
Enabling Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 676-77. Hence,
Petitioner was prosecuted twice - once in tribal court, and once in federal
court - for his role in the burglary of Mr. Johnson's house, and Mr. Smith
was never charged.
Statement of the Proceedings Below
At his federal bench trial, Petitioner raised two substantive defenses. First,
he raised the issue of double jeopardy pursuant to the view that the 1990
Amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), effected a
federal delegation of authority to tribal courts and therefore any subsequent
prosecution in federal court violated the Fifth Amendment constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. Second, Petitioner claimed a violation of
his equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment for the decision to
indict and prosecute him because of his racial identity as an Indian and the
failure to indict and prosecute Mr. Smith because of his racial identity as a
non-Indian.
The District Judge, Honorable Lawrence Hutton, dismissed the indictment
as violative of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. He also
ruled that the decision to indict and to prosecute Petitioner (and not indict and
prosecute Mr. Smith) did not constitute invidious racial discrimination under
the U.S. Constitution.
On appeal to the Fourteenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the panel reversed
the district court decision concerning its double jeopardy ruling as contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute, the clear legislative intent of Congress, and
Congress' plenary authority in Indian affairs. The panel nevertheless affirmed
the dismissal of the indictment on the alternative reasoning that the
prosecution of Petitioner was racially biased and in violation of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection.
Both parties filed petitions (and cross petitions) for certiorari to the United




issues. Specifically, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions of
whether the federal prosecution of Petitioner is barred by the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and/or whether the federal
prosecution of Petitioner is barred by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due
process and equal protection.
Summary of Argument
I. Double Jeopardy
A. The Duro override legislation does not imply that 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1948) excludes federal jurisdiction over non-member Indians such as
Petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the Duro override legislation, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(1990), should be read to grant sole jurisdiction over crimes committed by
non-member Indians on reservations to tribal courts. This reading, however,
contravenes the congressional intent behind the adoption of the Duro override
legislation and the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. In passing the Duro
override legislation, Congress intended to correct the Supreme Court's
erroneous finding that tribal court jurisdiction did not extend to non-member
Indians in Duro v. Reina. 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). Textually, there is no
indication in 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) that Congress intended to remove
jurisdiction over such matters from the federal courts. It is also clear that
Congress intended to grant federal jurisdiction over the fourteen enumerated
crimes in the Major Crimes Act in addition to the pre-existing tribal court
jurisdiction over such matters. As a result, this Court should reject the narrow
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 advocated by Petitioner in favor of a
broader interpretation which recognizes the congressional purpose established
in 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
B. United States v. Wheeler: The dual sovereignty exception negates
Petitioner's double jeopardy claim.
In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), the Supreme Court held
that no double jeopardy problem arises when both tribal courts and federal
courts prosecute for the same criminal act. Id. at 329. The Wheeler Court
reasoned that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is not
violated by prosecution in both the tribal courts and federal courts for the
same act because both tribal governments and the federal government are
sovereign nations. As both are sovereign nations, the dual sovereignty
exception applies and the Fifth Amendment guarantee against doublejeopardy
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is not violated. This holding is further supported by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2),
which specifies that the power to prosecute all Indians, including non-member
Indians, is an inherent power of the tribal governments. Therefore,
Petitioner's claim that his Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy is violated by federal prosecution is directly negated by the holding
in Wheeler.
C. Wheeler's Progeny: The dual sovereignty exception is applicable to
non-member Indians such as Petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the holding in Wheeler is not applicable in this case
because Petitioner is a non-member Indian, whereas the defendant in Wheeler
was a member Indian. This narrow interpretation of Wheeler has been directly
refuted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Enas, 255
F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008 (9th
Cir. 2002). Specifically, in Enas, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Wheeler holding, and therefore the dual sovereignty exception, is
applicable in cases involving non-member Indians because the power to
prosecute non-member Indians is an inherent power of tribal governments.
Enas, 255 F.3d at 664. Additionally, the court in Male Juvenile agreed with
this finding, holding that the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy
applies in instances involving non-member Indians as tribal governments are
sovereign nations. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d at 1021. As a result, Petitioner's
claim that the Wheeler holding is not applicable in this case fails because both
the Enas court and Male Juvenile court have held that the dual sovereignty
exception is applicable in cases involving non-member Indians tried by tribal
courts and federal courts.
II. Equal Protection
A. Congress retains the plenary power, not subject to strict scrutiny by the
courts, to regulate Indians as a separate people with their own political
institutions.
Petitioner challenges his indictment in federal court under the Major
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, as violative of his equal protection rights under
the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner asserts that he was prosecuted because of his
racial identity as an Indian, and that his alleged partner in the burglary, Mr.
Robert Smith, was not prosecuted because of his racial identity as a non-
Indian. Petitioner's equal protection claim fails, however, because the Major




classification. While the Major Crimes Act does single out Indians for federal
prosecution, the Act provides that Indians, classified by the Supreme Court in
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 N.24 (1974), as a separate political
group, are subject to the same punishment as any other person committing the
same offense. The Major Crimes Act is therefore not subject to strict scrutiny,
as the Fourteenth Circuit Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded.
Furthermore, the Act is rational as within Congress' plenary authority over
Indian affairs.
B. Selective Enforcement: Whether or not Mr.Smith is subject to federal
jurisdiction, Petitioner's selective enforcement claim fails.
Because the Major Crimes Act is itself constitutional, Petitioner's equal
protection claim must rely on a selective enforcement claim. To make a
successful selective enforcement claim, Petitioner must show that he was
singled out for prosecution because of his race, and that the selective
prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Petitioner cannot
make either claim effectively since he was selected for prosecution because
he is subject to federal criminal jurisdiction, while, under long standing
Supreme Court precedent, McBratney, 104 U.S. at 621, Mr. Smith is not.
Because there is no federal jurisdiction over Mr. Smith in this case, Petitioner
cannot make the claim that his race was even a possible factor in selecting him
for prosecution over Mr. Smith. Moreover, even if this Court were to accept
the dubious proposition that Mr. Smith is subject to federal jurisdiction, the
fact that Respondent believed there to be no jurisdiction negates the




Mr. Iron Hawk, Petitioner, argues that the Duro override legislation, 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990), effected a federal delegation of authority to tribal
courts and therefore any subsequent prosecution in federal court violated the
Fifth Amendment constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
Petitioner's argument fails for three reasons. First, in passing the Duro
override legislation, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990), Congress intended to
establish that tribal courtjurisdiction over non-member Indians is an inherent
power of tribal governments. Contrary to Petitioner's argument, the
congressional intent in passing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990) was not to remove
No. 1]
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jurisdiction over non-member Indians from federal courts. Additionally, the
Supreme Court in Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313, 330, found that the dual
sovereignty exception to double jeopardy applies to Indians who commit
crimes on tribal reservations. Petitioner asserts that the Wheeler holding is not
applicable in this case given that Petitioner is a non-member Indian.
Wheeler's progeny, Enas and Male Juvenile, however, indicate the contrary,
that Wheeler is applicable to non-member Indians. This is because tribal
governments have the inherent power to try non-member Indians and therefore
the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy applies. As a result,
Petitioner's claim that federal prosecution violated his Fifth Amendment
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy fails.
A. The Duro override legislation does not imply that 18 U.S. C. § 1153
(1948) excludes federal jurisdiction over non-member Indians such as
Petitioner.
Petitioner relies on the legislation, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990), to support
his argument that through the enactment of the Duro override legislation the
federal government delegated its ability to prosecute Indians to the tribal
courts. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990) was "an amendment to the Indian Civil
Rights Act" by Congress in 1990 to include language specifically recognizing
tribal court criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. This amendment was made
in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Duro, 495 U.S. 676. Petitioner
argues that the 1990 amendment should be interpreted narrowly to exclude
federal jurisdiction over Indians. In other words, Petitioner asserts that this
Court should narrowly construe 18 U.S.C. § 1153 by reading the grant of
tribal court jurisdiction given in 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990) to preclude
federal jurisdiction in 18 U.S.C. § 1153 over non-member Indians who
commit crimes on reservations other than their own reservation. A narrow
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 is not warranted, however, given the clear
congressional intent to allow for concurrent jurisdiction of tribal courts and
federal courts over actions taken by non-member Indians falling under 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (the Major Crimes Act).
According to 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990):
2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive,
legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by
and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian




recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians; (emphasis added)
Petitioner asserts that because 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990) specifically
recognizes the right of Indian tribes to "exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians"' the federal government therefore does not have jurisdiction over
Indians in criminal matters.
First, Petitioner's interpretation of the Duro override legislation
contravenes the clear congressional intent underlying the legislation.
Specifically, Congress acted to restore tribal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians, after the Supreme Court failed to recognize tribal court jurisdiction
over non-member Indians in Duro, 495 U.S. at 676. The purpose of the Duro
override legislation was therefore to maintain the concurrent jurisdiction of
tribal courts and federal courts over non-member Indians acting within
reservation territory. Enas, 255 F.3d at 669.
Additionally, Petitioner's interpretation of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990)
contravenes the existing law and statements that have been made by the
Supreme Court. Initially, it must be pointed out that 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) does
indicate that Indian tribes have criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, yet 25
U.S.C. 1301(2) fails to indicate that the jurisdiction of Indian tribes is
exclusive of federal jurisdiction. To the contrary, federal law indicates that
both federal courts and tribal courts are to have jurisdiction in situations such
as the one presently before the Court. Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Act
of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383; General Crimes Act, Act of Mar. 27,
1854, § 3, 10 Stat. 270; Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153; Indian Country
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
According to the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch.
92, 3 Stat. 383, federal criminal jurisdiction was extended to crimes
committed within Indian Country by any Indian, or other person or persons,
but "any offence committed by one Indian against another within any Indian
boundary" was excluded. In the present case, while Petitioner is an Indian, the
alleged victim, Mr. James Johnson, is a non-Indian resident of the reservation.
As a result, under the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, the federal courts
would have jurisdiction in this case. This is an indication of Congress' intent
1. Although Petitioner is not a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, this definition
would still apply to the case before the Court as Petitioner is an Indian and therefore falls within
the category of "all Indians." The definition does not delineate between member and non-
member Indians. In other words, Petitioner does not have to be a member of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe in order for this tribe to have jurisdiction over his actions while he is on the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's reservation. See generally Enas, 255 F.3d at 662.
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to maintain concurrent jurisdiction over non-member Indians, such as
Petitioner.
Additionally, under the General Crimes Act, Act of Mar. 27, 1854, § 3, 10
Stat. 270, an exception was included to exempt Indians from federal
jurisdiction when they had "been punished by the local law of the tribe." This
exemption, however, was specifically left out of the Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153. It is generally agreed upon that Congress acts purposely when
including or excluding language. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d at 1015 (citing
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)) ("[w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."). It can
therefore be concluded that the exclusion of Indians already punished in tribal
court from the Major Crimes Act was the manifestation of the congressional
intent to subject Indians to federal jurisdiction.
Similarly, the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1948),
excludes Indians who had "been punished by the local law of the tribe" from
subsequent federal prosecution. The Major Crimes Act, however, contains no
such exception. Congress' failure to include an exception for Indians already
punished in tribal courts further suggests congressional intent to ensure that
Indians are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of both tribal courts and
federal courts. Additionally, at least one federal court has reached a similar
conclusion, recognizing that the lack of a similar exception in the Major
Crimes Act for Indians who have already been punished in tribal court
suggests the existence of concurrent jurisdiction between tribal courts and
federal courts. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d at 1013.
It is important to note that the Indian Country Crimes Act's exemption is
specific to Indians who have already been punished, not merely tried. 18
U.S.C. § 1152. This language can therefore be interpreted as further evidence
that Congress intended for there to be concurrent jurisdiction between tribal
courts and federal courts without barriers arising from double jeopardy claims.
This is because by using the term "punished" it can be inferred that Congress
intended for federal jurisdiction to remain in cases where an Indian was tried
by a tribal court but not punished. As a result, even the Indian Country
Crimes Act can be read to favor the Respondent's position that no violation
of Petitioner's Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy has
occurred, because under the Indian Country Crimes Act, had Petitioner not
been punished by the tribal court there would be clear federal court




As previously indicated, Petitioner relies on the Duro override legislation
to support his assertion that to subject him to prosecution in federal court
would be contrary to the Fifth Amendment constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy. Precedent, as well as the legislation cited above, suggests
that in this case there is concurrent federal court and tribal court jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that tribal governments
have concurrentjurisdiction to punish conduct that also constitutes an offense
under the Major Crimes Act. Enas, 255 F.3d at 662; Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d
at 1008. Additionally, the legislative history of the Major Crimes Act strongly
supports the tribal court exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. See Robert
Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503, 559 n.295 (1976). In addition to
tribal courtjurisdiction, it is clear that the federal courts also havejurisdiction.
In fact, the federal courts have already determined this issue with explicit
reference to the Cheyenne River Sioux reservation. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that the federal government, rather than state
government, retained jurisdiction to try offenses committed by Indians on the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071
(8th Cir. 1988). This remains binding precedent in the circuit. Additionally,
denying federal jurisdiction over Petitioner is antithetical to the purpose of the
Major Crimes Act. This is, "[b]ecause the Major Crimes Act was enacted in
response to purportedly inadequate tribal punishments, it would make little
sense to allow a prior tribal punishment to prevent certain crimes from being
prosecuted under the MCA [Major Crimes Act]." Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d at
1020. As suggested by the court in Male Juvenile, this case presently before
this Court is an example of an inadequate tribal punishment, as Petitioner will
escape with only having paid restitution damages should federal jurisdiction
not be extended.
Regardless of whether or not the tribal court had actual subject matter
jurisdiction over Petitioner, it appears that Petitioner consented to the
jurisdiction of the tribal court. A person can consent to a court's assertion of
jurisdiction over them despite the fact that the court may not have been
granted subject matter jurisdiction. Rest. Conf. 2d § 32, Rest. J. 2d § 13.
Petitioner's ultimate consent to the tribal court's jurisdiction was manifested
by his failure to appeal his conviction in tribal court. Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
David W. Louisell, and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Jurisdiction: State and
Federal 20 (1980). The conclusion that Petitioner conceded to tribal court
jurisdiction is further evidenced by the fact that Petitioner accepted and
fulfilled the punishment given him by the tribal court. Therefore, because
Petitioner conceded to the tribal court's jurisdiction and the federal court has
No. 1]
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clearjurisdiction in this case, it is apparent that there is concurrentjurisdiction
between the two court systems.
B. United States v. Wheeler: The dual sovereignty exception negates
Petitioner's double jeopardy claim.
In Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330 (1978), the Supreme Court held that no double
jeopardy problem arises if both the tribal courts and federal courts prosecute
a member Indian for the same criminal act. The Wheeler Court reasoned that
there was no breach of the Fifth Amendment constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy in such cases because both the federal government and tribal
governments are sovereign nations.' As a result, because tribal courts, as
courts of sovereign nations, do not derive their power to adjudicate from the
federal government, the Wheeler Court concluded that both governments can
prosecute a member Indian separately for the same offense.
The case presently before the Court is similar to the matter brought before
the Wheeler Court because in both cases the Indian Nations, the Navajo
Nation in Wheeler and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in the present case, are
punishing the accused under their own laws. In Wheeler, this distinction was
important because it is consistent with the argument that federal and tribal
governments are distinct and separate sovereign nations, which punish the
accused under separate laws.3 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326. In the present case,
Petitioner was charged with violating the Cheyenne River Law and Order
Code § 5-1-3 in the tribal court. In the federal court, however, Petitioner was
charged with violating the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Consistent
with the Wheeler Court's reasoning, Petitioner has been charged under two
separate laws promulgated by two separate sovereign nations.
Additionally, underlying Petitioner's argument that prosecution in the
federal courts is barred by the Fifth Amendment constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy is the assumption that the punishment decided upon
2. The United States has recognized the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and, as such, it is
a federally recognized tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1 (1994). As a federally recognized tribe, the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has the status of being a "domestic dependent nation." See
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
3. This distinction between the federal government and Indian governments is consistent
with the distinction between state and federal prosecutions. State prosecution does not bar
federal prosecution and vice versa, because the prosecutions fall under the law of separate
nations. As a result, prosecutions by both state and federal governments do not, in the words
of the Fifth Amendment, "subject [the defendant] for the same offence." See, e.g., Moore v.




by the tribal court should hold in this case. The tribal court in this case found
Petitioner guilty and required him to apologize to the victim and compensate
the victim for his loses (approximately $500). It is likely that Petitioner would
face a far more severe punishment in federal court should he be found guilty
in the federal court as well. Therefore, should this Court refuse federal
jurisdiction in this matter, the problem illuminated by Justice Stewart in
Wheeler would come to fruition. Specifically, Justice Stewart stated,
The same sort of "undesirable consequences" identified in Abbate
could occur if successive tribal and federal prosecutions were
barred despite the fact that tribal and federal courts are arms of
separate sovereigns. Tribal courts can impose no punishment in
excess of six months' imprisonment or a $500 fine. 25 U.S.C. §
1302(7). On the other hand, federal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians includes many major offenses. 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (1976) Thus, when both a federal prosecution for a major
crime and a tribal prosecution for a lesser included offense are
possible, the defendant will often face the potential of a mild tribal
punishment and a federal punishment of substantial severity... the
prospect of avoiding more severe federal punishment would surely
motivate a member of a tribe charged with the commission of an
offense to seek to stand trial first in a tribal court. Were the tribal
prosecution held to bar the federal one, important federal interests
in the prosecution of major offenses on Indian reservations would
be frustrated. (citations omitted)
Wheeler, 435 U.S at 330-331. Therefore, in order to avoid the policy problems
envisioned by Justice Stewart, it is imperative that this Court reject
Petitioner's arguments with regard to his claim that federal jurisdiction is
precluded by the Fifth Amendment constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy.
Alternatively, Petitioner may attempt to argue that Wheeler does not apply
to the case presently before the Court, because in Wheeler the defendant was
a member of the Navajo Nation and in the present case Petitioner is not a
member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. Despite this difference, the
reasoning of the Wheeler case should still apply to the present case for several
reasons. First, the present case is consistent with Wheeler, because, as
previously indicated, Petitioner is being punished under different laws from
two separate sovereign nations. The Court in Wheeler relies heavily on the
fact that the federal government and tribal governments are distinct sovereign
nations, indicating that the important litmus test is whether the tribal
No. 1]
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government is a sovereign nation and not whether the individual is a member
of the tribe. This conclusion is supported by the decision in Male Juvenile
that recognized that prosecution in tribal court and federal court is allowed
under the dual sovereignty exception to the double jeopardy doctrine.
Furthermore, the question of non-member prosecution was recently
laid to rest in an en banc decision of this court, United States v.
Enas, decided while this appeal was pending. Enas, 255 F.2d 662
(en banc). There, we held that a tribal court exercising its power to
prosecute a non-member Indian under the Indian Civil Rights Act
acts as a separate sovereign, making a subsequent prosecution by
the federal government permissible under the dual sovereignty
double jeopardy doctrine.
Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d at 1021.
Despite the fact that Petitioner is not a member of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, he has acted in a manner consistent with being a member of the
tribe and, as a result, he owes allegiance to the tribe. Petitioner has acted in
a manner consistent with being a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe
for several reasons. Notably, he has obtained benefits from his association
with the tribe, namely his ability to live within tribal housing in the Red
Scaffold Community. Additionally, his wife and children are all members of
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and his children attend the tribally run
school, Cheyenne River Elementary School, suggesting that his ability to
sustain his family is substantially enhanced by his connection with the tribe.
Petitioner, therefore, receives many of the benefits bestowed upon members
of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. In fact, there is nothing to suggest from
the facts before the Court that Petitioner receives fewer benefits than an
"official" member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe does. While Petitioner
may not formally be a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Petitioner
functions as a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly concluded that a person who
is treated by the tribe as a member of the tribe could be found to be a de facto
member of the tribe. United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996). In
finding that the child in Keys, Jane Doe, was a member Indian of Colorado
River Indian Tribe for purposes of tribal courtjurisdiction, the Keys court held
as dispositive the fact that the Colorado River Indian Tribe treated Jane Doe
as a member of their tribe. Keys, 103 F.3d at 761. Similarly, the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe has consistently treated Petitioner as a member of the tribe,
notably by giving him accommodation on the reservation and educating his




Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and the tribe appears to consider Petitioner a de
facto member of the tribe, it would not be unjust to treat Petitioner similarly
to the defendant in Wheeler.
C. Wheeler's Progeny: The dual sovereignty exception is applicable to
non-member Indians such as Petitioner.
While Petitioner may attempt to argue that Wheeler cannot appropriately
be applied to the present case given that Petitioner is a non-member Indian,
two cases following Wheeler clearly show that Wheeler can be applied in
instances where the defendant is a non-member Indian, such as the present
case. Specifically, both Enas and Male Juvenile have addressed the issue of
whether the dual sovereignty exception applies in instances where both tribal
courts and federal courts have asserted jurisdiction over crimes emanating
from the same action of a non-member Indian. In both cases, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals - relying on Wheeler - concluded that the dual
sovereignty exception did apply.
In Enas, the defendant, a non-member Indian, stabbed an enrolled member
of the White Mountain Apache Tribe on the tribe's reservation. The court
considered whether an Indian tribe and the federal government may twice
prosecute a non-member Indian for the same conduct without offending the
double jeopardy clause. In answering this question, the court looked at the
distinction between "inherent" and "delegated" powers of Indian tribes.
According to the court,
[i]f the tribe was acting pursuant to its inherent power when it
prosecuted Enas, then the dual prosecutions were undertaken by
separate sovereigns, and were therefore constitutionally
permissible. If, however, the tribe was exercising power delegated
by Congress, then it was acting as an 'arm of the federal
government,' Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328, rather than employing its
own sovereign authority, and the federal prosecution is barred.
Enas, 255 F.3d at 664. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that prosecution of non-member Indians by tribal courts does not preclude
subsequent federal courtjurisdiction under the 1990 amendments to the Indian
Civil Rights Act. Id. The court in Enas based its conclusion in part on the
finding in Wheeler that tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians was an
inherent power of tribal governments which was merely recognized by the
1990 amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act. Enas, 255 F.3d at 669.
Further support for applying the Wheeler holding to non-member Indians
can be found in Male Juvenile. While the Male Juvenile court declined to go
No. 11
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into a discussion of the inherent powers of tribal governments, the court did
conclude that the controlling question when deciding whether the dual
sovereignty exception applies to non-member Indians is whether the tribal
governments have the inherent power to put non-members on trial. Male
Juvenile, 280 F.3d at 1021. The court in Male Juvenile went on to accept the
Enas court's decision, holding that, "a tribal court exercising its power to
prosecute a non-member Indian under the Indian Civil Rights Act acts as a
separate sovereign, making a subsequent prosecution by the federal
government permissible under the dual sovereignty doublejeopardy doctrine."
Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d at 1021. It is therefore apparent from both Enas and
Male Juvenile that the power to prosecute non-member Indians is an inherent
power of tribal governments and that the dual sovereignty exception to double
jeopardy therefore applies in the present case, making the extension of federal
jurisdiction over Petitioner valid.
II. Equal Protection
Petitioner claims his equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment
have been violated by the decision to prosecute him under the Major Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 1153, and the failure to prosecute his non-Indian cohort in the
burglary. "While the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause,
it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process."' Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964), see also Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954). The Court's approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498, 500 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 (1973).
The prosecution of Petitioner does not violate the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection because 1) the statute under which he is being
charged, the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, is constitutional as it
provides for equal protection of Indians, and 2) there is no selective
enforcement in this case. Petitioner alleges that he is being prosecuted because
of his racial identity as an Indian, and that the failure to prosecute his alleged
co-conspirator, Mr. Robert Smith, is due to his status as a non-Indian. For
Petitioner to make a valid equal protection claim as his defense against
prosecution he must either show that the statute under which he is being
charged uses an impermissible racial classification and cannot withstand a
strict scrutiny analysis, or that he is being selectively prosecuted because of




his race. Petitioner can make neither claim with any effectiveness. First, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held the Major Crimes Act to be constitutional
under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977);
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973). Second, any successful selective
enforcement claim must contain evidence of a discriminatory purpose, which
Petitioner's claim lacks.
A. Congress retains the plenary power, not subject to strict scrutiny by the
courts, to regulate Indians as a separate people with their own political
institutions.
As an initial matter, the Major Crimes Act, under which Petitioner is being
prosecuted in federal court, has been held to be within Congress' plenary
power to regulate Indian affairs.4 In determining that the Major Crimes Act
is constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, the Antelope Court said, "this
Court has consistently upheld federal regulations aimed solely at tribal
Indians, as opposed to all persons subject to federal jurisdiction." Antelope,
430 U.S. at 649. As the Court noted in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552
(1974), the Constitution "singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate
legislation."
Petitioner may claim because he is not an enrolled member of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe, on whose reservation the crime occurred, to prosecute him
as an "Indian" under the Major Crimes Act is to prosecute him as a racial
Indian, and not a political one. While the Antelope Court noted that "federal
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act does not apply to 'many individuals
who are racially to be classified as Indians,"' Antelope, 430 U.S. at 647
(quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 553), Petitioner is not to be classified as a racial
Indian for purposes of federal prosecution. He is an enrolled member of an
Indian tribe, the Rosebud Sioux, and he committed a crime within Indian
country. Thus, Petitioner is subject to federal criminal jurisdiction under the
Major Crimes Act, just as the respondents in Antelope were. "[A]s enrolled
tribal members, respondents were subjected to federal jurisdiction only
because their crimes were committed within the confines of Indian
country.. . ." Antelope, 430 U.S. at 647. Indeed, Petitioner is subject to
federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act not because he is a racial
Indian, but because he is an enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe.5
4. Congress' plenary authority to regulate Indian affairs derives from the United States
Constitution, which gives Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. As noted above, Petitioner is also a "de facto" member of the Cheyenne River Sioux
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1. The Major Crimes Act does not rely on an unconstitutional racial
classification.
Petitioner may claim that the Major Crimes Act is itself unconstitutional
because it utilizes an impermissible racial classification in targeting Indians
as the only group subject to punishment under the statute. Based on the
reasoning in Morton, the use of the term "Indian" in the language of the
statute is not a racial categorization subject to strict scrutiny analysis as the
Fourteenth Circuit Panel erroneously concluded. United States v. Iron Hawk,
400 F. 3d 200 (14th Cir. 2002). Rather, it is a political categorization and is
reflective of the historical treatment of Indians as protectorates of the United
States government. Morton, 417 U.S. 535, 553. For this reason, the statute is
subject only to rational basis analysis. The pertinent part of the Major Crimes
Act reads:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely,
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under
chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault
with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury
(as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an
individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson,
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title
within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
(emphasis added).
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). The text of the statute specifically
provides that Indians who commit crimes in Indian country shall be subject to
equal treatment as non-Indians committing the same offenses within federal
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Supreme Court has completely rejected equal
protection challenges to this statute. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 641 (1977); Keeble,
412 U.S. at 212. The Antelope Court directly addressed the question
"whether... federal criminal statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the
Tribe under the reasoning in United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758,761 (9th Cir. 1996). See also
Exparte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (7th Cir. 1938), (holding that enrollment in an official tribe is not
an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction where the Indian defendant lived on the




Fifth Amendment by subjecting individuals to federal prosecution by virtue
of their status as Indians." Antelope, 430 U.S. at 642. As a basis for its
holding, the Antelope Court held the classification of Indians under the Major
Crimes Act is a political one arising from "the unique status of Indians as a
'separate people' with their own political institutions." Id. at 646; see also
Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 (establishing that federal regulation of Indian tribes
is not to be viewed as the regulation of a racial group, but, rather, as
governance of once-sovereign political groups). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals subsequently applied Antelope when it rejected an equal protection
challenge to the Major Crimes Act in United States v. Yazzie, 693 F.2d 102,
104 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the use of state standards in 18 U.S.C. §
1153 to punish prohibited conduct does not violate equal protection). It is
therefore clear from the established precedents that the Major Crimes Act
does not rely on an unconstitutional racial classification.
2. United States v. Rogers was misconstrued by the Fourteenth Circuit
Court of Appeals and does not apply to the Major Crimes Act.
The Fourteenth Circuit Court of Appeals below held, as a basis for its
dismissal of Petitioner's indictment, that the relevant case law treats Indians
as essentially racial in nature. United States v. Iron Hawk, 400 F.3d 200 (14th
Cir. 2002). This holding contravenes the well accepted and long established
rule that Indian status is, in fact, a political classification and not an
impermissible racial classification. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553. The appeals court
relied on United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846), in which the Court held
that a white person seeking exemption from federal criminal jurisdiction, who
became a member of a Cherokee tribe through marriage, is not "Indian" for
purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. The Rogers Court held:
[A] white man who at mature age is adopted in an Indian tribe does
not thereby become an Indian . . . . He may by such adoption
become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and make himself
amenable to their laws and usages. Yet he is not an Indian; and the
exception [for Indians] is confined to those who by the usages and
customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It
does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally, -
of the family of Indians.
Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572-573. The appeals court was right to point out that
Rogers turned on a categorization of the defendant in that case as a racial non-
Indian. However, the appeals court extrapolated an overly-broad legal
conclusion from the Rogers holding. The Rogers Court, in fact, established
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two criteria to "test" for Indian status: 1) the degree of Indian blood; and 2)
tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian; a test that subsequent courts
have generally followed. Keys, 103 F.3d at 761; United States v. Broncheau,
597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979). Both the Keys court and the Broncheau
court applied Rogers, and went on to hold that federal jurisdiction based on
Indian status does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the term
"Indian" describes a political group and not a racial group. This is, in fact,
well settled law after Morton, 417 U.S. at 551-552, and its progeny. Thus, the
characterization of Indians as a "racial group" in Rogers is confined to that
case only, and has been implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in cases that
directly address the classification of Indians in the Major Crimes Act itself.
Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646; Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212.
3. Rational Basis: The Major Crimes Act has passed rational basis
scrutiny, and is within Congress' plenary authority over Indian affairs.
Finally, the Major Crimes Act has withstood rational basis analysis. Yazzie,
693 F.2d at 104; Antelope, 430 U.S. at 649. In each case, the court held that
it is rational for Congress to enact a law that treats Indians in the same manner
as all other persons subject to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 649. Petitioner may
contend that in this case there was disparate treatment because Mr. Smith
committed the same crime in the same location and was not subject to any
punishment, whereas Petitioner was subject to both federal criminal sanction
and tribal court sanction. This contention, however, is also without merit. As
a general matter, Congress is not required to eliminate all differences in
treatment between Indians and non-Indians, as long as all persons subject to
federal jurisdiction are treated the same. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646; Yazzie,
693 F.2d at 104. If, as Respondent believes, there is no federal jurisdiction
over Mr. Smith in this case, then it is simply not necessary for Mr. Smith and
Petitioner to be treated equally. If there is federal jurisdiction, Petitioner's
only claim can be one of selective enforcement since it is well established that
the Major Crimes Act is constitutional. Petitioner's selective enforcement
claim, as discussed below, is similarly unavailing.
B. Selective Enforcement: Whether or not Mr.Smith is subject to federal
jurisdiction, Petitioner's selective enforcement claim fails.
To sustain an equal protection claim based on selective enforcement,
Petitioner must show 1) that he was singled out for prosecution "on the basis
of an impermissible ground such as race, religion, or exercise of [his]




1989); and 2) that the selective prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 1336; Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
Petitioner can show neither.
On the first factor, Petitioner was selected for prosecution in federal
criminal court because of the crime he committed under a statute that brings
him squarely under federal criminal jurisdiction, and not because of his race.
Mr. Smith, on the other hand, is not subject to federal criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to the rule created in McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), that a crime
between non-Indians on an Indian reservation is a matter of state jurisdiction.
The fact that Mr. Smith was not selected for prosecution implies nothing to
support a claim that Petitioner was selected because of his race. On the
second point, that the selective prosecution must be motivated by a
discriminatory purpose, Petitioner can point to no evidence to support such a
claim.
For Petitioner to prove either prong of his selective enforcement claim, he
must, as a precursor, establish that Respondent could have prosecuted both
Petitioner and Mr. Smith. Because there is no federal jurisdiction over Mr.
Smith, Petitioner's selective enforcement claim necessarily fails.
1. McBratney and its progeny firmly establish that crimes between non-
Indians on a reservation are matters of state, and not federal
jurisdiction.
Respondent was merely following settled law when deciding not to indict
Mr. Smith for lack ofjurisdiction. In McBratney, a non-Indian defendant, who
murdered another non-Indian on the Ute reservation in Colorado, challenged
his indictment and conviction in federal court on the ground that he was not
subject federal jurisdiction for a crime he committed on an Indian reservation.
The McBratney Court held that "the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Colorado has no jurisdiction of this indictment [and] should deliver
up the prisoner to the authorities of the State of Colorado to be dealt with
according to law." McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624. The Supreme Court has since
interpreted McBratney to mean that "a non-Indian charged with committing
crimes against other non-Indians in Indian country is subject to prosecution
under state law." Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643. In Prentiss v. United States, 206
F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in discussing
the implications of the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1948),
set forth a three-part rule for what level of government has jurisdiction in
which cases:
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Accordingly, under § 1152, contrary to the language of the statute
but consistent with constitutional, sovereignty, and trustee
concerns, crimes within Indian country that did not involve an
Indian are, therefore, state crimes, see, e.g., McBratney, 104 U.S.
621, 26 L.Ed. 869, crimes between an Indian and a non-Indian are
federal crimes, and crimes exclusively between Indians are, with
some exception, matters of tribal law rather than state or federal
law.
Prentiss, 206 F.3d at 968 (noting in a following footnote that the Indian Major
Crimes Act makes some crimes between Indians occurring in Indian country
a matter of federal jurisdiction).6
Because Mr. Smith is not subject to federal criminal jurisdiction, Petitioner
cannot claim that he was treated differently than Mr. Smith under this statute,
since all that is required of the statute is that it treats people who are subject
to federal jurisdiction equally, which it does. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 649. The
statute is simply not required to ensure the elimination of all disparities in the
treatment of Indians and non-Indians. Id. at 646; Yazzie, 693 F.2d at 104.
2. Petitioner may claim that the Enabling Act of South Dakota provides
for federal criminal jurisdiction, but Petitioner's selective enforcement
claim fails nonetheless.
Petitioner may assert that Mr. Smith is subject to federal criminal
jurisdiction based on the Enabling Act that made South Dakota a state.
Petitioner may further assert that this argument is not inconsistent with the
holding in McBratney. In McBratney, which concerned a crime on the Ute
reservation in Colorado, the determinative factor was that the Enabling Act of
Colorado retained state jurisdiction over Indian lands. McBratney, 104 U.S.
at 624. South Dakota's Enabling Act is different, however, in that it cedes
jurisdiction over Indian lands to the federal government. The Act reads:
[t]hat the people inhabiting said proposed states do agree and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof,
6. The existence of federal jurisdiction over non-member Indians should not be read to
exclude tribal jurisdiction. Rather, the Prentiss test should be read as recognizing federal
jurisdiction in addition to the pre-existing tribal jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). In





and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have
been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and
remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the Congress of the United States.
Enabling Act of South Dakota, Act of February 22, 1889, Ch. 180, § 4. 25
Stat. 676. 7
Precedent also supports the view that Indian lands in South Dakota fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Congress. Hollister v.
United States, 145 F. 773 (8th Cir. 1906); Brown v. United States, 146 F. 975
(8th Cir. 1906). The Hollister Court held that,
Pursuant to the requirements of the enabling act of Congress, the
people of South Dakota in the adoption of their Constitution in
1889 agreed, among other things, by article 26, that all Indian lands
should remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of
Congress until the Indian title thereto should be extinguished by
the United States.
Hollister, 145 F. at 778. Furthermore, in a comparison of McBratney and
Hollister, the Brown court noted that the McBratney rule only applied to
crimes committed "in a sovereign state the admission of which into the Union,
without any exception with respect to the Indian reservations therein or the
jurisdiction over them, removed those reservations from the plenary authority
of the United States ... " Brown, 146 F. at 977. Moreover, the Brown court
noted that the Hollister case "related to a crime committed in an Indian
reservation in South Dakota, jurisdiction to punish which had been completely
ceded to the United States by the state and accepted by Congress before its
commission." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Petitioner has some basis for his
necessary (to make an equal protection) claim of federal jurisdiction over Mr.
Smith. While rational, this argument nonetheless contravenes the well
established Supreme Court precedent that there is no federal jurisdiction over
crimes between two non-Indians on an Indian reservation. Antelope, 430 U.S.
at 643; see also, Prentiss, 206 F.3d at 968.
7. Incidentally, the local state prosecutor in South Dakota interpreted the Enabling Act of
South Dakota to exclude state jurisdiction over Mr. Smith. Of course, the local prosecutor's
discretionary acts have no bearing on whether or not Respondent is guilty of infringing on
Petitioner's equal protection rights under the United States Constitution.
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Furthermore, even if this Court accepts Petitioner's claim that Mr. Smith
is subject to federal jurisdiction, Petitioner's selective enforcement claim is
still without merit because it was Respondent's belief that there was no federal
jurisdiction, and not a discriminatory intent, that prevented Mr. Smith's
indictment, If this Court accepts Respondent's interpretation of McBratney,
then the fact that Mr. Smith was not charged is, at worst, a consequence of a
flawed application of precedent in a complicated area of jurisprudence. This
mistake, if there was one, certainly does not imply that Mr. Smith was not
indicted because of his race as a non-Indian, or that Petitioner's indictment
and prosecution is motivated by racial discrimination. In other words, even if
the court accepts the proposition that Respondent could have indicted Mr.
Smith, the reason for not doing so does not sustain a selective enforcement
claim because there was no invidious racial discrimination.
Conclusion
Petitioner has raised two substantive defenses: that his Fifth Amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy, and that his equal protection rights, have
been violated. Specifically, in arguing that his Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy has been violated, Petitioner argues that the Duro
override legislation, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (Indian Civil Rights Act), should be
read to grant jurisdiction over non-member Indians to only tribal courts.
Rather, this Court should reject such a narrow interpretation of the Major
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 1153, in light of the history of congressional intent to
maintain concurrent tribal court and federal court jurisdiction. The Major
Crimes Act was enacted to specifically grant federal court jurisdiction over the
fourteen enumerated crimes in the Act. Additionally, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(1990) recognizes the inherent power of tribal governments to assert
jurisdiction over Indians, including non-member Indians. Read together, it is
clear from these two statutes that Congress intended for concurrent
jurisdiction to exist between the tribal courts and federal courts over non-
member Indians.
Additionally, this Court can look to Wheeler to find that the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is not violated by prosecutions
in both tribal courts and federal courts. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Specifically, the
Wheeler court found that as both the federal government and tribal
governments are sovereign nations the dual sovereignty exception to double
jeopardy applies. Id. The holding in Wheeler has been applied to non-
member Indians, like Petitioner, in Enas and Male Juvenile. The Enas court




member Indians, because tribal governments have the inherent power to
prosecute non-member Indians, as evidenced by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990).
The Male Juvenile court concurred with the holding in Enas, as the court held
that because tribal governments are sovereigns they possess the right to
prosecute non-member Indians. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d at 1021. As a result
of the holding in Wheeler and the subsequent application to non-member
Indians in Enas and Male Juvenile, this Court should reject Petitioner's claim
that his Fifth Amendment guarantee against doublejeopardy has been violated
because the dual sovereignty exception applies in this case.
Petitioner's defense to his indictment in federal court on Fifth Amendment
equal protection grounds is also without merit. First, the statute under which
Petitioner was charged is constitutional. The Major Crimes Act has previously
withstood equal protection challenges, and the Supreme Court has consistently
held that it is rational for Congress to ensure that Indians who commit crimes
on a reservation are subject to the same laws as all other persons who are
subject to federal jurisdiction and who have committed the same offenses.
Because the statute itself is valid, Petitioner's only other equal protection
claim is that he was selectively prosecuted because he is Indian. This claim is
similarly unavailing. Petitioner's non-Indian alleged partner in the burglary
was simply not subject to federal jurisdiction under either the statutory
scheme Congress has devised for regulating crimes in Indian country or settled
Supreme Court precedent. It is impossible that Petitioner was 1) selected for
prosecution over Mr. Smith because of his race, and 2) that the prosecution
was motivated by a discriminatory intent. Neither contention is valid because
it was jurisdictionally not possible to prosecute Mr. Smith under federal law.
Alternatively, even if it was possible to prosecute Mr. Smith in federal court,
the fact that Respondent thought it to be impossible negates the necessary
discriminatory intent required to sustain a selective enforcement claim. For the
above reasons, Petitioner's equal protection claim fails. Simply put, he was
indicted and charged in federal court for his role in burglarizing a private
home on an Indian reservation, which is against the laws of the United States.
Ultimately, this Court must reject Petitioner's claims that his guarantee
against double jeopardy, and that his equal protection rights, are being
infringed by his prosecution in federal court. To hold otherwise would be to
upset Congress' carefully enacted statutory scheme to regulate Indian affairs,
as well as Supreme Court precedent.
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